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I. INTRODUCTION
The Giant was loose again in the land, but its rulers seemed un-
concerned. Instead, they were pleased that the Giant had re-
turned once more, for they had gone to great lengths to lure him
back, had thrown themselves supplicant at his feet and even
pleaded desperately for the Giant to help them out of the eco-
nomic turmoil in which they found themselves. Yet, in their ea-
gerness to court the Giant's favor, the rulers had forgotten that
the Giant was often an extremely rude and demanding guest.
They had also forgotten those earlier days, when the Giant in
his greed had turned the country's green mountains and forests
into barren brown slag hills and bogs, while leaving only a pit-
tance in payment. The rulers of the land, overjoyed at the Gi-
ant's return, seemed not to have retained the lessons learned
from the Giant's last visit.1
Historically, Mexico and the Andean Common Market
(ANCOM) 2 had imposed severe restrictions on foreign investment
in order to limit the presence of direct foreign investment (DFI) in
their countries. Within the last decade, however, Mexico has ag-
gressively sought to attract foreign investment capital, and the
ANCOM countries now actually encourage foreign investment in
their countries. Consequently, as the allegory above explains, Mex-
ico runs the risk of repeating the mistakes of the past, continuing
the cycle of DFI famine to feast to famine. In contrast, the
ANCOM nations still restrict DFI to a great degree and are moving
1. This allegory builds upon Ewell Murphy's allegory of 1982, which told of "the Giant
People who roamed in the North" in reference to greedy U.S. investors who took much in
the way of resources from the people of Mexico and left them with very little gold and skills
in return. See Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Echeverrtan Wall: Two Perspectives on Foreign
Investment and Licensing in Mexico, 17 TEx. INT'L L.J. 135 (1982).
With the enormous economic changes that have taken place since Murphy wrote his
article, the present allegory should be extended a bit further to include investment from all
over the world, not just foreign investment from the United States.
2. The ANCOM group consists of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
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so slowly that they may become permanently mired in their re-
strictive past. Therefore, while one Latin American country may be
developing too fast, another whole block of countries may not de-
velop fast enough. Yet, although the two sets of countries have
adopted different approaches to liberalizing DFI restrictions, both
are struggling to find that delicate balance between a healthy in-
flux of DFI and loss of control over their countries to foreign influ-
ence. Furthermore, neither set of countries wishes to repeat the
mistakes of the past.
Hopefully, neither Mexico nor the ANCOM countries will fail
to strike that all-important balance, for either too much or too lit-
tle DFI in a Latin American country now carries much heavier eco-
nomic and environmental consequences than in earlier times. If in
the future a Latin American government does away with restric-
tions, it may again find it necessary to impose the same, or even
more drastic, restrictions on foreign investment in order to bring
"the Giant" under control. The result may be chaos and an even-
tual return to impoverishment. The Latin American country with
too little DFI may follow the same, though less complicated path;
it may simply wallow in the poverty of its own underdevelopment.
However, Latin American countries can avoid the dreadful
hangover of the present-day DFI bacchanalia or the agonies of DFI
anorexia if, with respect to deregulation of foreign investment,
they adhere to the principle of moderation. This Article proposes
that Latin American countries will be able to go a long way toward
striking that essential balance between DFI and control over their
economies by incorporating certain key components into their for-
eign investment laws.
Parts I and II of this Article outline the history of Latin
American foreign investment laws (FILs), beginning in the 1970s.
Part II identifies some important elements of FILs and analyzes
certain aspects of Latin American FILs that discouraged DFI in
the 1970s and early 1980s.3 Part III examines the changes in FILs
during the 1980s and points out those components of FILs that
encourage direct foreign investment. Part IV argues that certain
3. Note, however, that this Section will not discuss direct expropriation. This Article
assumes that Latin American governments now recognize the futility of expropriation, have
abandoned the practice, and will try to avoid it in the future if at all possible. See Jtlrgen
Voss, The Protection and Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Coun-
tries: Interests, Interdependencies, Intricacies, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 686 (1982), (arguing
that investment protection, not expropriation, should be fostered in Third World countries).
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restrictive elements of FILs that Latin American governments
have abandoned actually protect important national interests and
should be included in their respective FILs. Part V concludes by
offering Latin American countries a solution to regulating DFI that
satisfies their particular political and economic needs. This Article
argues that Latin American countries should devise FILs that en-
courage DFI, but that they should also be wary of implementing
foreign investment laws that may later be repealed as part of a
political backlash against foreign control of strategic industries.
Although DFI control affects countries throughout Latin
America, this Article will primarily focus on Mexico and the
ANCOM group for analytical purposes. The ANCOM group is ap-
propriate to this discussion because it represents a group of devel-
oping countries with some of Latin America's most restrictive
FILs, and these countries have been slow to abandon the "depen-
dency" philosophies of the 1970s for the "free market" philoso-
phies of the 1980s.4 Mexico deserves discussion because it is one of
the leading countries in the restrictive movement of the 1970s, and
seems to be leading the "free market" movement of the late 1980s
and early 1990s.5 By analyzing Mexico and the ANCOM group, it
will be possible to economically analyze the major schools of
thought concerning foreign investment regulation in Latin America
without drowning the reader in a sea of statistical detail.
II. RESTRICTIVE OR PROHIBITIVE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAWS DEVELOPED IN THE 1970s
Before beginning this discussion, it is important to note that
this Article deals exclusively with direct foreign investment (DFI).
For the purposes of this Article, DFI does not include portfolio in-
vestment, which consists largely of loans to host country entities,
both public and private.6 Although Latin American governments
4. See Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Andean Decisions on Foreign Investment: An Interna-
tional Matrix of National Law, 24 INT'L LAW. 643 (1990).
5. For examples of Mexico's aggressive move to attract DFI, see Mexico Eases Mining
Curb on Foreigners, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 28, 1990, at D5; Joe W. Pitts, Pressing Mexico to
Protect Intellectual Property, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1991, at A13; Randall Smith, South-
western Bell, 2 Others Win Right to Acquire 51% Voting Stake in Telmex, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 10, 1990, at A3.
6. See Joseph J. Jova, Clint E. Smith & T. Frank Crigler, Private Investments in Latin
America: Renegotiating the Bargain, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J. 3, 24 (1984) (discussing the distinc-
tion between direct investment and portfolio investment). Jorgen Voss has provided per-
haps the most comprehensive definition of DFI:
[Vol. 23:1
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presently find DFI very attractive, foreigners will not find invest-
ing in Latin America attractive unless they feel confident that they
will see a return on their investment. 7 Consequently, foreign inves-
tors consider both the return on their investment and the risk of
the investment when deciding whether to invest in a particular
country. One commentator has identified the following factors
that foreign investors consider in determining whether to invest in
a developing country:
(1) Institutions and economic policies of the country: e.g., cen-
trally-planned or free market; policies toward foreign invest-
ment; degree of sophistication of its financial and administrative
institutions; administrative procedures for initiating and operat-
ing investments in the country;
(2) Infrastructure: transportation networks; industrial estates
and free trade zones; educated labor force; degree of discipline
in labor/management relationships; availability of marketing ar-
rangements; available technological elements; available support
services;
Direct investment means the investment of money, goods or services in a project
for entrepreneurial commitment, especially establishing subsidiary companies or
take-over of enterprises; capitalising branches and plants (endowments); secur-
ing equity holdings in corporations with powers of management and control
(generally 25%); making long-term loans with low or partnership-type interest
rates in conjunction with equity holdings.
Such investments are thus characterized by their direct use for a specific
project (not through the capital market), amortisation and profit dependent
upon the success of the project (entrepreneurial risk), long-term or unlimited
period and an enduring entrepreneurial commitment to the project accompany-
ing the investment. This is in contrast with "portfolio investments" which are
placed through the market without entrepreneurial commitment, are relatively
short-term and made only for the sake of capital yield (fixed interest securities,
capital shares of enterprises without controlling interest, bank loans, etc.), and
other capital investment (purchase of real estate, etc.). In contrast with these
types of investment, the direct investor also provides a package of business and
technical know-how for the project.
Voss, supra note 3, at 686.
7. See Adeoye Akinsanya, International Protection of Direct Foreign Investments in
The Third World, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 58; see also Jova, Frank & Crigler, supra note 6, at
6 ("Investment capital flows to markets that offer the greatest return of invested funds with
least possible risk.").
8. In discussing return on investment, Americans usually focus on the short-term re-
turn, while other countries, notably the Japanese, focus on the long-term return. Unfortu-
nately, both analyses are limited in that they necessarily leave out such factors as potential
development of the country and future development of consumer markets, just to name a
few. Conversely, developing countries, in assessing the return on DFI, consider the potential
political instability but rarely take into consideration such factors as depletion of natural
resources (though this may not be the case in oil-producing countries) and the long-term
effects on the environment from pollution, deforestation, erosion, and so forth.
1991]
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(3) Legal Aspects: substantive rules governing foreign invest-
ment, e.g., investment codes, labor laws, tax regulations, and
available dispute resolution procedures;
(4) Political risk: degree of political and economic stability; exis-
tence of a national development program; terms for profit trans-
fer and capital repatriation.'
Moreover, this same commentator also identified a number of
global factors existing today which may deter foreign investors
from investing outside of their own country. They are:
(1) Slower rates of growth and demand in industrialized
countries;
(2) The protectionist policies of industrial countries that dis-
courage DFI based on export growth;
(3) A marked drop in commodity prices that has drastically re-
duced the export earnings of developing countries;
(4) The decreasing share of labor costs in overall production cost
of manufactured goods;
(5) The increasing reliance of industrial countries on substitutes
to primary commodities. °
Since these global factors also play an important role in the inves-
tor's return on his investment, they become less relevant as the
risk and return factors mentioned above appear more attractive to
the foreign investor and more relevant as those factors appear less
attractive.
Latin American countries need DFI to aid economic develop-
ment. Therefore, DFI recipients want the investors to make money
from the investment, although perhaps for reasons different than
those of the foreign investors. The host country, for example, may
receive many benefits as a consequence of the DFI turning a profit,
the most important benefit being an increase in real economic
growth for the country."'
DFI has the following important advantages over portfolio
investment:
9. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Factors Influencing the Flow of Foreign Investment and the
Relevance of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Scheme, 21 INT'L LAW. 671, 679-87
[hereinafter Factors].
10. Id. at 673-74.
11. "Developing countries . . . seek foreign investment as a means to increase the rate
of real growth, when internal capital accumulation is insufficient to pay the costs of import-
ing the capital goods, advanced technology, and management skills necessary to sustain
[such] development." Jova, Frank & Crigler, supra note 6, at 6.
[Vol. 23:1
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(1) DFI provides not only funds, but also an integrated package
of financial resources, managerial skills, technical knowledge,
and marketing connections;
(2) DFI does not create a debt. The investors bear the risk of
project failure; the lender has the right to repayment regardless
of the project's success;
(3) DFI injects other benefits from internationally competitive
enterprises into the local economy, e.g., improved production
techniques and management skills;
(4) DFI often works as a catalyst for other lending activities in
the local economy."
Yet, while Latin American countries find DFI desirable, these
countries must also be careful not to lose control over their pre-
cious natural resources, their economies, or their very countries as
a result of their efforts to attract DFI.
Historically, Latin American governments have not been suc-
cessful in achieving a beneficial balance between DFI and sover-
eign control.'3 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many Latin Amer-
ican countries feared becoming "dependent" upon foreigners for
their economic, and consequently political, stability and therefore
enacted laws that restricted the amount of DFI allowed in their
countries."' Many countries feared that foreigners would take con-
12. See Factors, supra note 9, at 675.
13. Jove, Frank & Crigler argue that "[t]he need to create a successful, mutually benefi-
cial accommodation between private capital and public policy remains the great task of this
century ...." supra note 6, at 3. However, they point out that Latin America has been
historically unsuccessful in striking that delicate balance, as Latin American countries have
swung wildly in their policies from unrestricted DFI to repressive FILs. See id. at 11-22. For
an historical overview of ANCOM's foreign investment policy, see Allan Preziosi, Comment,
The Andean Pact's Foreign Investment Code Decision 220: An Agreement to Disagree, 20
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 649, 652-58 (1989).
14. See Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra note 6, at 16 n.39 (citing the theories of FERNANDO
HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO FALETrO, DEPENDENCIA Y DESAROLLO EN AM9RICA LATINA (1969));
JAMES D. COCKCROFT, ANDRt GUNDER FRANK & DALE L. JOHNSON, DEPENDENCE AND UN-
DERDEVELOPMENT (1972); MIGUEL S. WIONCZEK, INVERSI6N Y TECHNOLOGIA EXTRANJERA EN
AMIkRICA LATINA (1971); Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, AM. ECON.
REV., May 1970, at 231; Osvaldo Sunkel, Big Business and "Dependencia": A Latin Ameri-
can View, 50 FOREIGN ApF. 517 (1972). One commentator has offered the following explana-
tion of "dependencia," or dependency theory:
Dependency theory hypothesized that underdevelopment is perpetuated by
socio-political and economic domination by a developed focal state to which the
lesser developed states are peripheral. The state of dependency benefits a fa-
vored local class with close ties to the focal state. This class attains power and
retards a more "healthy" economic relationship to protract the relationship.
Michael G. Thornton, Comment, Since the Breakup: Developments and Divergences in
ANCOM's and Chile's Foreign Investment Codes, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 239,
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trol of important natural resources and business enterprises.15
They also feared that multi-national corporations would engage in
restrictive business practices, influence political decisions, and dis-
regard critical social problems.16 Most importantly, these countries
feared becoming dependent upon DFI-that foreign investment
could displace local national entrepreneurship, preempt financing
of local ventures, and have negative effects on their balance of pay-
ments accounts.1 7 Many developing countries, including those in
Latin America, came to believe that DFI was a hindrance to devel-
opment and eventual self-sufficiency, and, consequently, they
243 (1983) (citing Scott Horton, Peru and ANCOM: A Study in the Disintegrations of a
Common Market, 17 TEx. INT'L L. J. 39, 42 (1982)).
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT: GLOBAL
TRENDS AND THE U.S. ROLE 30 (1984)[hereinafter GLOBAL TRENDS]. See also Jove, Smith &
Crigler, supra note 6, at 15.
16. GLOBAL TRENDS, supra note 15, at 30.
17. DFI critics argued that each of these consequences may occur under the depen-
dency theory:
(1) Displacement of national entrepreneurship. In most cases it means that the
foreign investor will out-perform and possibly displace the national investor.
Most investments that further industrialization and development require sophis-
ticated technology, and the local investor will not own or have independent ac-
cess to that technology;
(2) Preemptive financing. The local firm or individual is likely not to be as solid
a credit risk as the large foreign firm, and the latter may use local financing and
credit leverage to buy into local enterprises while national interests find further
expansion or diversification impossible because they lack an equal credit rating;
(4) Restraints on technology transfer. Agreements on technology transfer have
generally not been subject to official scrutiny and in the past investors have de-
manded dependency creating contract clauses, which are accepted as a matter of
course: selling unnecessary technology in a package with essential technology on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis; selling older technology and machinery that keeps the
host country's industry a generation behind that of the foreign investor's home
operation; price and marketing restrictions on all items produced with the tech-
nology so as to assure that no competing expert capacity will be developed; and
provisions requiring that any technological advance developed within the host
country reverts automatically to the seller of the technology, with no rights re-
tained by the buyer;
(5) Balance of payment effects. Latin American theorists also assert there is a
negative effect on balance of payments attendant upon dependency, and that
effect is especially heightened by foreign investments in the manufacturing sec-
tor. Whereas foreign investment in natural resources or primary materials al-
most always results in substantial exports and balance of payments credits, man-
ufacturing normally produces little or no export earnings. While this saves the
country the cost of paying for imports of manufactured items, dependency econ-
omists counter that the import-substituted manufactured items almost always
cost significantly more than the same items on the free world market.
Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra note 6, at 16-17. See also Thornton, supra note 14, at 244 n.21.
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adopted foreign investment laws (FILs) that either directly or indi-
rectly restricted or prohibited foreign investment in their coun-
tries. 8 For example, Mexico, under President Echeverria, imposed
even tougher restrictions on DFI in all of its industries,19 and the
Andean Group took similar restrictive steps in adopting Decision
24 under the Cartagena Agreement.2
18. The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States is an excel-
lent indicator of the more restrictive stance that Latin American and other developing coun-
tries began taking toward DFI during the 1970s. This charter was primarily initiated by
former President Echeverria of Mexico, a proponent of aggressive government control of
DFI. See Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra note 6, at 20-21. See also UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
OF EcONoMIc RIGHTS AND DUTIEs OF STATES, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
William S. Gaud, Executive Vice President of the International Finance Corporation
gauged the atmosphere for DFI in the 1970s well when he stated, "There are many countries
in Asia, Africa, and in Latin America where foreign investment is welcome. But in others
foreign private investment is decidedly not popular, and in a few countries the nationaliza-
tion and expropriation-sometimes domestic and foreign-seem to be the order of the day."
William S. Gaud, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the
Promotion and Protection of Private Foreign Investments 1 (Munich 1972).
One commentator of the time suggested that the move to more restrictive FILs was part
of a worldwide phenomenon of the 1970s, "a sort of British-born, Fabian-socialist revolu-
tion" which had as its primary goal a redistribution of the world's wealth. See Jova, Smith
& Crigler, supra note 6, at 25-26 (citing Patrick Moynihan, The U.S. in Opposition, CoM-
MENTARY, March 1975, at 31).
In Chile the general trend was toward "gradually increasing discrimination against for-
eign investment. This trend peaked with the Marxist Allende government (1971-73) which
expropriated numerous large assets, including the world's two largest copper mines owned
by American interests." See INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, infra note
25, at 51, 52.
In Mexico, the result of its Foreign Investment Law of 1973 (Ley Para Promover la
Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera, 316 D.O. 5, Mar. 9, 1973) [hereinaf-
ter Mexican Foreign Investment Law] was "a rather uncomfortable straitjacket for foreign
investment in Mexico." Murphy, supra note 1, at 139. See also Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra
note 6, at 3 (describing the "increasingly nationalistic-sounding Latin American govern-
ments and fearful foreign investors . . . engaged in negotiating new agreements based on
substantially tougher host country restrictions and reluctant accommodation by foreign
companies.").
By the very nature and basis of their economies during the 1970s and early 1980s, east
bloc countries such as the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria had
extremely restrictive FILs. See generally Christina L. Jadach, Ownership and Investment
in Poland, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63 (1985); Maciej Lebkowski & Jan Monkiewicz, Western
Direct Investment in Centrally Planned Economies, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 624 (1986). Un-
til it began to liberalize its foreign investment policies in the 1980s, the People's Republic of
China had very little foreign investment "[l]argely in reaction to the trade abuses suffered
by China in the nineteenth century. . . ." Frederic C. Rich, Joint Ventures in China: The
Legal Challenge, 15 INT'L LAW. 183, 185 (1981).
19. See Mexican Foreign Investment Law, supra note 18.
20. Formally titled the Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital, and of
Trademarks, Patents Licenses and Royalties, November 30, 1976, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 138
(1977)[hereinafter Decision 24]. Decision 24 is described in Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra
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The restrictive FILs of Latin American countries in the 1970s
contained several common elements that discouraged DFI in par-
ticular industries, or across the board."1 Important elements com-
mon to all these Latin American FILs were:
(1) application and approval procedures through which DFI
must pass before being allowed into the country;
(2) equity participation restrictions or outright prohibitions; and
(3) technology transfer restrictions.2
Because each of these elements plays an important role in encour-
aging or discouraging DFI, this article will analyze these elements,
as they have appeared in the FILs of Mexico and the ANCOM na-
tions, in the next three subsections.
A. Overly Restrictive Screening and Approval Procedures
Beginning in the 1970s, Latin American countries instituted
various forms of screening and approval procedures that restricted
DFI. Latin American FILs required that foreign investors submit
to a formal application and screening process and, in some coun-
tries, a full-scale negotiation over the terms of the DFI. As the fol-
lowing discussion should demonstrate, these procedures often con-
sumed a great deal of the foreign investor's time and resources,
thereby discouraging DFI.
As a rule, registration and approval procedures cause an inor-
dinate amount of delay in developing countries.2 3 As a first step to
note 6, at 18-19. See also Dale B. Furnish & William W. Atkin, The Andean Group's Pro-
gram for Industrial Development of the Metalworking Sector: Integration with Due and
Deliberate SPID, 7 LAW. AM. 29 (1975); Dale B. Furnish, The Andean Common Market's
Common Regime for Foreign Investments, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313 (1972); Covey T.
Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code, 66 Am. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972). Members of
the Andean Group include Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Chile was a
member until 1976.
21. GLoBAL TRENDs, supra note 15, at 30.
22. This is by no means a complete list of elements that make up FILs. Most notably,
capital repatriation and taxes have not been included.
23. In Pakistan, for example, the approval and registration process took many months,
unless the investment had high-priority, e.g., computers. See Richard de Belder &
Makdoom Ali Khan, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Pakistan, 20 INT'L LAW. 535, 539.
In Egypt, it took seven years to get approval for a joint venture between GM and Isuzu; over
seven years for Michelin to obtain approval to build a tire plant; five years for GE to obtain
approval to build a refrigerator plant. Many blamed the reason for the delays on "the im-
penetrable bureaucracy . .. [and] the inexhaustible red tape" involved in obtaining ap-
proval. Middle East Executive Reports 8 (June 8, 1983). Even though Morocco enacted a
more liberal foreign investment code in 1982, one of the main problems associated with
[Vol. 23:1
FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW
investing in Latin American countries, the foreign investor almost
always had to submit an application to the appropriate govern-
ment agency for approval, as many countries would not allow DFI
into the country unless the foreign investor first submitted an ap-
plication to the government agency in charge of overseeing foreign
investment.
24
After submitting an application to the appropriate agency, the
approval process for the DFI had only just begun. The foreign in-
vestor then became entangled in evaluation of the application by
the governmental bureaucracy. In many cases, the sole purpose of
the screening process was to provide a forum for negotiation in
which the government's agents could seek to gain either as much
advantage for the government or as much control over the DFI as
the foreign investor would allow before withdrawing the
application.2
Since Latin American governments had a great fear that
multi-national corporations, left unrestricted, could very well end
up controlling the entire country, many governments found a
screening and approval procedure to be an appropriate valve
through which the government could control DFI. Through this
process the government could evaluate whether the DFI was desir-
able and, if so, negotiate for a better return for the host country. If
the government wished to preclude DFI in particular industries or
investment in Morocco was still the approval and registration process. Morocco: New Code
Favourable to Foreign Investors 3 Co. LAW. 286 (1982).
24. Mexico: Mexican Foreign Investment Law, supra note 18; Ley sobre el Registro de
la Transferencia de Tecnologia y el uso y Explotaci6n de Patentes y Marcas, 315 D.O. 45,
Dec. 30, 1972 [hereinafter Mexican Registration and Transfer of Technology Law].
ANCOM: See Decision 24, supra note 20, at art. 2.
Chile: Under the FIL that took effect in 1974, a Foreign Investment Committee ap-
proved all DFI. Foreign Investment Statute, Decree-Law No. 600, Preamble, July 13, 1974,
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 1176 (1974) [hereinafter DL 600]. The Foreign Investment Committee
used a fixed term contract of ten years to formalize its approval of DFI, although it allowed
for extensions up to twenty years when such an extension was justified. DL 600, arts. 1, 3.
Venezuela: See Robert J. Radway & Franklin T. Hoet-Linares, Venezuela Revisited:
Foreign Investment, Technology, and Related Issues, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 1, 17
(1982)(discussion of registration requirements imposed by the Superintendency of Foreign
Investments (Superintendencia de Inversiones Extranjeras (SIEX))); see text accompany-
ing infra notes 35-36.
25. In Ecuador, DFI was often approved on a case-by-case basis subject to negotiation.
See 4 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES: WEST-
ERN HEMISPHERE (EXCLUDING CANADA) 104 (1983) [hereinafter INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE]. The Chilean FIL was silent as to certain details such as profit re-
mittances, tax rates, and exchange rates. Presumably, these issues were left open deliber-
ately for determination during contract negotiations. See Thornton, supra note 14, at 253.
1991]
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in important natural resources, it could enforce this prohibition
quickly and efficiently, with little investment of resources. It would
simply disapprove the application. However, if the government
wanted to admit the DFI but wished to impose performance re-
quirements, expatriation restrictions or special taxes upon the DFI,
it frequently engaged in long, tense negotiations on each point un-
til the application was finally approved."6
To add to the woes of the investor, the bureaucratic process
was often incredibly cumbersome. For example, the Mexican regis-
tration and approval process was a byzantine work of bureaucratic
beauty. While the procedures seemed to provide extremely tight
control on DFI entering the country, they were complex and con-
fusing. For instance, the Mexican Foreign Investment Law pro-
vided that the Foreign Investment Commission (FIC) would have
general oversight of the law, but then the FIC left the actual ap-
proval of DFI to various ministries.21 Yet, while other ministries
approved the DFI, the FIC still issued resolutions governing DFI
policy, one of which gave itself veto power over DFI in certain cir-
cumstances.2 8 With such overlap in the approval system, the for-
eign investor had to acquire the approval of both the agencies and
the FIC.
As if the system for DFI approval was not complicated
enough, the Mexican Foreign Investment Law also required after-
the-fact registration for broad categories of persons and events,
including:
(1) foreigners who made regulated investments in Mexico;
(2) Mexican companies in which foreign investors took shares;
(3) Mexican trusts in which foreigners participated; and
26. For an example of the details that needed to be ironed out in negotiations, see
Thornton, supra note 14, at 253. Also, even in Canada, which is not normally thought of as a
"developing country," final DFI approval under the restrictive Foreign Investment Review
Act (FIRA) rested with the Cabinet, which over-politicized the process and thrust a much
heavier work-load on the Cabinet. Keith R. Evans, Canada for Sale: The Investment Ca-
nada Act, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 85, 87 (1987) (citing FIRA, § 13). Yet, while FIRA required
that the Cabinet approve or deny the investment within specified time periods, foreign in-
vestors frequently experienced delays of as long as 180 days, with the median time for
processing half the applications being 150 days. Id. at 87 (citing Wayne Lilley, FIRA and
Loathing on the Rideau, CAN. Bus., Sept. 1981, at 43-44.
27. Mexican Foreign Investment Law, supra note 18, at arts. 9, 10.
28. Resolutiones Generales de la Commisi6n Nacional de Inversiones Extranjeras, 333
D.O. 8, Nov. 5, 1975 [hereinafter General Resolutions No. 1-10], specifically No. 8; 343 D.O.
3, July 27, 1977 [General Resolutions 12-15], specifically, Nos. 12, 15; 344 D.O. 3, Sept. 6,
1977 [General Resolution No. 16]; 369 D.O. 9, Nov. 19, 1981 [General Resolution No. 17].
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(4) stock certificates owned by, or pledged to, foreigners.29
Not only were these regulations cumbersome to foreign investors,
they may have had no legal basis, and at least one scholar has ar-
gued that they had no statutory basis at all.
30
With respect to technology transfers, the government could
nullify written agreements, take away investment incentive bene-
fits, or even levy a fine if the foreign investors, or their partners,3 1
failed to register a written instrument that dealt with technology
transfers.3 2 Furthermore, the government could refuse to register
an instrument on seventeen discretionary grounds.33 However, the
law did allow minor exceptions for temporary installation and re-
pairs, installation data included in a purchase package with ma-
chinery or equipment, certain emergency services, vocational
schools and employee training, copyright licensing for public me-
dia, government-to-government assistance and consulting agree-
ments where the consultant was Mexican. 4
Similarly, all foreign investments in ANCOM countries had to
be authorized by the recipient country's national approving au-
thority.36 The competency of these agencies, however, were often at
issue. In Venezuela, for instance, government neglected the office
of Superintendent of Foreign Investment (SIEX). The government
first assigned a customs official with little international trade expe-
rience and then appointed a Deputy Minister of Finance who had
too little time to devote to the office .3 As a consequence, the credi-
bility of the office declined, undoubtedly impacting on Venezuela's
desirability as a prospective investment opportunity. In Columbia
and Peru, DFI had to be registered and approved before it could
29. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 139 (outlining registration requirements of Mexican
Foreign Investment Law, supra note 18, at art. 23.
30. See IGNACIO GOMiEz PALACIO Y GUTIERREZ ZAMORA, ANALISIS DE LA LEY DE INVERSION
EXTRANJERA EN MEXICO 125-43 (1973).
31. "Partners" could include anyone, "whether Mexicans or foreigners, and even agen-
cies of the Mexican government." Murphy, supra note 1, at 140 (citing Mexican Foreign
Investment Law, supra note 18, at art. 5).
32. Technology transfer agreements include patents, copyrights, certificates of inven-
tions, trademarks, trade names, technology, industrial copyrights, or expertise. See Mexican
Foreign Investment Law, supra note 18, at arts. 6, 11, 19, 23. See also Murphy, supra note
1, at 139.
33. See Mexican Foreign Investment Law, supra note 18, at arts. 15-17; see also infra
notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
34. Mexican Foreign Investment Law, supra note 18, at art. 3.
35. Decision 24, supra note 20, at art. 2.
36. Radway & Hoet-Linares, supra note 24, at 27.
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be imported.37 Ecuador is a good example of an ANCOM country's
screening and approval procedures. Although Ecuador would ap-
prove almost all applications from reputable companies,38 it would
do so only after running the prospective investor though a negotia-
tion process that caused great delay.39
After foreign investors became aware of the tremendous log
jam that the governments had created in the agencies responsible
for approval of DFI applications, the investors became discouraged
and often decided to invest elsewhere. The approval procedures
that the foreign governments had installed to control the nature
and amount of DFI that flowed into their countries had become so
constrictive that they helped choke off DFI.
B. Restrictions on Equity Participation
In the 1970s, Latin American countries wished to reduce or
eliminate their dependence upon DFI. The easiest way to achieve
this goal was to reduce DFI's influence in their major industries.
Consequently, Latin American countries began to impose restric-
tions upon the level of DFI participation in their corporations.
That foreign investors could no longer hold more than a fifty per-
cent equity stake in a Latin American corporation was perhaps the
most important restriction that Latin American countries imposed.
Foreclosing foreign majority ownership in corporations resulted in
a mass exodus from these countries of foreign capital which was
not to return.
Under the leadership of President Echeverria, Mexico adopted
a forty-nine percent rule, along with other equity participation re-
strictions, that slowed the flow of new DFI to a trickle. Under the
Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Invest-
ment, all new DFI had to be in a joint venture composed of at least
fifty-one percent Mexican participation, unless the National For-
eign Investment Commission specifically exempted.40 The Commis-
sion, however, prudently exempted border industries (maqui-
ladoras) from the requirement and made other minor exceptions to




40. See Mexican Foreign Investment Law, supra note 18, arts. 5, 12.
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its otherwise restrictive policy.4 1 The law also required that the
government screen all takeovers of Mexican firms and that Mexi-
cans have a right of first refusal before a foreigner could acquire a
controlling interest in a Mexican firm.42
Mexico limited DFI in the manufacture of automobile compo-
nents to forty percent. 8 In all other enterprises, the Foreign In-
vestment Commission would rarely allow new equity positions of
more than forty-nine percent.4 4 Mexico also prohibited foreign in-
vestors from investing in its electrical power, railroad, telegraph, or
the telecommunications industries, as these industries were re-
served for the state. Finally, only Mexican citizens could invest in
radio and television, urban and inter-urban automotive transport,
domestic air and maritime transportation, forestry, and gas
distribution.
In the oil and mining industries, Mexico has historically oscil-
lated between allowing unbridled influx of DFI in its petrochemical
industry to suffocating regulation.45 Even before the forty-nine
percent rule, the Mexican Constitution had already limited invest-
ment in primary petrochemical industries.46 Under the Mexican
Foreign Investment Law of 1973, foreigners could not invest in
41. See Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra note 6, at 24.
As of April 1975, the Commission had issued four general rulings. They cover (1)
exemption of border industries from the fifty-one percent Mexican ownership
rule [49% foreign ownership rule]; (2) permission for additional foreign capital
to be invested in existing joint ventures through capital increases providing the
ratio of Mexican to foreign investment is not changed to the detriment of the
Mexican stockholders; (3) authorization for foreigners to acquire up to five per-
cent equity in Mexican firms through stock market purchases; and (4) authoriza-
tion under most circumstances to reelect present foreign directors to boards on
Mexican firms.
Id.
42. See Mexican Foreign Investment Law, supra note 18; Murphy, supra note 1, at
137.
43. Mexican Foreign Investment Law, supra note 18, at art. 5.
44. In the first three years of administering the Mexican Foreign Investment Law, the
Foreign Investment Commission had only made an exception to the 49% rule in ten cases,
and in most of these cases the Commission required that the investors Mexicanize in the
future. Murphy, supra note 1, at 138 (citing Frank M. Lacey, Protection of Foreigners'
Rights in Mexico, 13 INT'L LAW. 83, 90 n. 38 (1979)).
45. For a brief overview of the history of the Mexican government's role in regulating
the petrochemical industry, see Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A Fifty- Year Per-
spective on World Petroleum Arrangements, 24 TEx. INT'L L.J. 13, 23-30. The Mining Laws
of 1884 and 1892 essentially allowed foreign investors to purchase fee simple interests in the
land they wished to exploit. Id. at 23-24. Compare this approach with President Lazaro
Cadenas's announcement in 1938 that Mexico was expropriating the oil industry. Id. at 29.
46. See generally MEx. CONST. tit. I, ch. 3; tits. II, VIII, and IX.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
that country's primary petrochemical industries. In addition, the
government limited DFI in the secondary petrochemical industry
to forty percent of the venture. 47 In Mexico, foreign investors were
not allowed to invest in the radioactive mineral industry, and in-
vestment in national reserve mining was limited to thirty-four
percent.4
ANCOM countries imposed restrictions similar to Mexico's on
equity participation in many important industries. These restric-
tions not only slowed the flow of new capital, but also greatly con-
tributed to the flight of foreign capital out of ANCOM countries
during the 1970s. ANCOM's Decision 24 required that foreigners
control no more than forty-nine percent of a given enterprise, and
those investors who did have majority control after the adoption of
Decision 24 usually had to divest themselves of majority control
within fifteen or twenty years."9 Additionally, Decision 24 provided
that foreign investors could not "buy out failing nationally owned
businesses unless no other buyer is found. '5 0 Note that Venezuela,
Colombia, and Peru followed Decision 24 in restricting foreign
ownership of marketing companies to forty-nine percent,"1 but
Venezuela went further in requiring that foreigners reduce their
participation in insurance and reinsurance companies from forty-
nine percent to less than twenty percent.52 All ANCOM countries,
except Venezuela, prohibited DFI in public services .5  ANCOM
47. Mexican Foreign Investment Law, supra note 18, art. 5.
48. Id.
49. See Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra note 6, at 18.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Decree No. 1.200, January 1, 1974 (Venez.); INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE, supra note 25, at 65, 235.
52. See Law of July 2, 1965, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA. No. 984, July 9, 1975
(Venez.)(concerning insurance and reinsurance companies).
53. Peru disallowed foreign investment in public services. See INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 25, at 235. Colombia disallowed investment in public
services but, like Mexico, also prohibited DFI in advertising, radio broadcasting, television,
newspapers, and magazines. Id. at 66. Chile followed the ANCOM agreement by limiting
DFI participation in Chilean enterprises through DL 600, supra note 24, which prohibited
foreign acquisition of more than 20% of any existing privately owned enterprise. The regu-
lation also provided an exception to the rule if a foreign investor's participation in an ex-
isting enterprise was of great importance to the nation, but Chile rarely invoked this excep-
tion. DL 600, supra note 24, art. 17.
Although Venezuela did not prohibit DFI in public services, it only allowed "national
companies" in the public service areas, which include telephone, water and sewage, electric-
ity, and health services. Decreto No. 1.200, art. 21(a) defines "public services" as: "tele-
phone, telecommunications, drinking water, sewerage, the generation, transmission, distri-
bution, and sale of electricity, health services, and those involving the protection and
custody of goods and persons." Decreto No. 1.200, art. 21(a), 664 GACETA LEGAL 842, Aug.
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countries, like Mexico, also put their oil and mining industries
under state control.5 4 Venezuela, for instance, nationalized its steel
and, de facto, its aluminum industries in 1975, at almost the same
time it nationalized its oil industry. Although it had been looking
for DFI joint venture partners for its aluminum industry, it found
no interest.55 Bolivia also kept all of its radioactive mining and
mineral smelting industries state controlled.
56
Therefore, both Mexico and the ANCOM countries imposed
forty-nine percent equity participation limits on foreign capital.
The forty-nine percent equity participation restriction had a great
impact on foreign investors who could no longer take a majority
stake in a corporation based in a Latin American country, and this
rule discouraged a great many foreign investors in the 1970s and
1980s.
C. Restrictions on Technology Transfer Agreements
Latin American countries, worried about becoming dependent
upon DFI, thought they saw a way to cut the cord to foreign capi-
tal through strict regulation of technology transfer agreements.
Historically, because foreign investors had greater bargaining
power than Latin American countries, these agreements contained
a wide range of adhesion clauses, which resulted in large profits for
foreign investors, only low-wage jobs for the local populace, and no
actual transfer of technology to the Latin American country. Latin
American countries sought to bring this unhappy state of affairs to
an end by banning the restrictive clauses in the agreements and
appointing a government agency to regulate transfer agreements.
Foreign capital, realizing that they would no longer reap enormous
31, 1986 (Venez.)[hereinafter Decreto No. 1.200].
In addition, Venezuela only allows "national companies" (companies less than 20% for-
eign-owned) in the television, radio, newspaper, and Spanish magazine businesses. See Id.,
art. 21 (b).
54. In Bolivia, the state ran the petrochemical industry through the Ministry of Energy
and Hydrocarbons and Yacimientos Pertroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), a state-owned
corporation. INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 25, at 39. In
Colombia, the state owned the oil industry, but foreign investors could form joint ventures
with the state-owned company Ecopetrol if the foreigner absorbed the exploration risks. Id.
at 65. In Venezuela, the government prohibited DFI in petroleum exploitation and national-
ized the industry in 1976. See Organic Law Reserving to the State the Industry and Com-
merce of Hydrocarbons, Aug. 29, 1975, art. 6, translated in 14 I.L.M. 1492, 1493-94 (1975).
See also Radway & Hoet-Linares, supra note 24, at 5.
55. Radway & Hoet-Linares, supra note 24, at 6-7.
56. INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 25, at 37.
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profits while safeguarding their technological secrets, reacted by
staying away from Latin America.
Mexico perhaps most vividly illustrates this turn of events.
The Mexican Technology Transfer Law of 1976 required registra-
tion of all contracts for the sale of foreign technology to Mexican
firms.5 The purpose of the law was to avoid payment of excessive
or unjustified prices for foreign technology and to eliminate certain
restrictive clauses believed to have been included in past technol-
ogy transfer contracts without reservation of rights to the buyer.5 8
The law therefore prohibited such clauses as: free grant-backs,
price-fixing, marketing restrictions, 9 foreign choice of forum
clauses,1° and clauses allowing participation in a licensee's manage-
ment." The government could also refuse registration if the inves-
tor failed to guarantee the "quality and results" of the licensed
technology; if it refused to indemnify the licensee against third-
party infringement claims;62 if the license was for longer than ten
years;63 if the licensee was restricted from disclosing the technology
after the license term;64 if the technology was already available in
Mexico;6" or if the license called for a royalty that was dispropor-
tionate to the technology furnished or economically oppressive to
the licensee or the Mexican economy.66
Moreover, under the Mexican patent law, patents were only
valid for up to a ten-year non-renewable term.6 7 The government
could license the rights to someone else if the license was not ex-
ploited within three years,68 and the unexploited patent would
lapse if no one requested a license during the fourth year,69 al-
though the literal interpretation of this provision has not always
57. See Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra note 6, at 24 (citing Ley sobre el Registro de la
Transferencia de Tecnologia y el uso y Explotaci6n de Patentes y Marcas, 315 D.O. 45,
Dec. 30, 1972, reenacted with amendments, Ley sobre el Control y Registro de la Transfer-
encia de Tecnologia y el uso y Explotacibn de Patentes y Marcas, 370 D.O. 15, Jan. 11,
1982 [hereinafter Mexican Technology Transfer Law]). See also Pitts, supra note 5, at A13.
58. Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra note 6, at 24.
59. Mexican Technology Transfer Law, supra note 57, at art. 15, paras. 2-9.
60. Id. art. 16, para. 4.
61. Id. art. 15, para. 1.
62. Id. art. 15, paras. 12, 13.
63. Id. art. 16, para. 3.
64. Id. art. 15, para. 11.
65. Id. art. 16, para. 1.
66. Id. art. 16, para. 2. See also Murphy, supra note 1, at 141.
67. Mexican Registration and Transfer of Technology Law, supra note 24, art. 40.
68. Id. arts. 41, 50-58.
69. Id. art. 48.
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been enforced. 0 In addition, the Mexican government would not
allow inventions to be patented if they fell in one of ten categories,
such as chemical products, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, pesticides,
herbicides, and food and drink. 1 The inventor could get a "certifi-
cate of invention" that would require him to grant nonexclusive
licenses for royalties established by the Mexican government, but
the availability of that privilege was extremely limited.72 The law
also required that all trademarks registered abroad be "linked"
with a trademark originally registered in Mexicos.7  Finally, trade-
marks were only protected for five years.74
Faced with such prohibitive restrictions on the transfer of
technology, it is no wonder that foreign investors were hesitant to
transfer technology to Mexico. Moreover, the Mexican govern-
ment's restrictions on DFI may have damaged Mexican interests
that wanted to go international as much as foreign investors that
wished to invest in Mexico. 5 In addition, some of the restrictions,
including those found in General Resolution No. 17, could have re-
sulted in retribution from countries such as the United States.7 6
Decision 24's drafters believed that investors had used tech-
nology contracts to hide repatriation of excessive profits.7 Like
Mexican law, the ANDEAN Code prohibited clauses that re-
stricted or limited a technology's value to the recipient country,
e.g., grant-back clauses. 78 Decision 24 also imposed more drastic
restrictions by prohibiting local companies from paying royalties to
their foreign parents or affiliates.79 In addition, repatriation of roy-
70. Murphy, supra note 1, at 141 (citing Dfvalos, Patents, Trademarks and Transfer
of Technology in Mexico, in FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION, 1980 PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED
STATES-MEXICO TRADE LAW CONFERENCE 1.
71. Murphy, supra note 1, at 142 (citing Mexican Registration and Transfer of Tech-
nology Law, supra note 24, at art. 10).
72. Id. at 142 (citing Mexican Registration and Transfer of Technology Law, supra
note 24, at arts. 127-28).
73. Murphy notes that this provision stiffed great controversy in the international
trademark bar. Id. at 142 nn. 52-55 and accompanying text.
74. See Pitts, supra note 5.
75. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 148-49 (proposing a hypothetical).
76. General Resolution No. 17, supra note 28, prohibited advertisements -for the sale of
foreign real estate from appearing in Mexican communications media. Ewen Murphy pos-
ited that there would be nothing to stop the United States from banning Mexican resort
advertisements in the Houston Post as a countermeasure to this resolution. Murphy, supra
note 1, at 148-49
77. See Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra note 6, at 19. Also note that, in Venezuela, SIEX
oversees technology transfer contracts. Decreto No. 1.200, supra note 53, at 847.
78. Decreto No. 1.200, supra note 53, art. 65, at 847.
79. See id. art. 21, at 842; See also Regional Developments (Latin America), 22 INT'L
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alties under registered technology transfer contracts were limited
to fourteen percent of the investment, although that figure was
later increased to twenty percent."0
Encouraged by the riches that some were reaping in the boom-
ing oil market, Mexico and the ANCOM nations set out to rid
themselves of the influence of foreign capital by developing policies
that discouraged DFI. Among these policies were the implementa-
tion of labyrinthine registration and approval procedures, as well
as severe restrictions of foreign equity participation and technology
transfer agreements. As a result of these policies, Mexico and
ANCOM were successful in reducing the DFI flow into their coun-
tries. Unfortunately, when the oil boom went bust and the interna-
tional economy faltered in 1982, these countries could not rely on a
steady flow of DFI to buoy their economies. Furthermore, because
of foreign investors' disaffection with these countries as a conse-
quence of the earlier restrictions, Mexico and ANCOM had to take
even more drastic steps to relax or abolish earlier restrictions in
order to persuade foreign investors to invest in their countries once
again.
III. RECENT CHANGES IN LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT
LAWS THAT ENCOURAGE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
In the 1980s, Latin American countries began to realize that
the flaws in the 1970s FILs were that they gave the governments
too much control. Consequently, foreign investors became. discour-
aged, and the flow of DFI to those countries slowed to a trickle.
8'
As the flow of DFI slowed and Latin American countries gained
the control they desired, they turned to international banks to fill
the capital needs that DFI left unsatisfied.8 2 This influx of loan
money sustained the Latin-American economies through the boom
periods of the late 1970s.11 However, when the Latin American
LAW. 222 (1988)[hereinafter Regional Developments 1].
80. See Decision 24, supra note 20, art. 37, at 150.
81. The Mexican Technology Act of 1976 "actually decreased the flow to Mexico of
technology needed for economic development." Pitts, supra note 5. ANDEAN group DFI
policies of the 1970s clearly reduced the inflow of DFI. See Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra
note 6, at 31.
82. Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra note 6, at 31.
83. "Too much foreign debt and not enough equity investment in the 1970s, so the
argument goes, made it difficult for them [developing countries] to adjust their economies to
external shocks since interest payments on debt, unlike dividends, cannot be cut when times
are bad." No Direct Answer, THE ECONoMisT, April 27, 1985, at 92.
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economies began to falter in the 1980s, the banks would no longer
continue to lend, leaving DFI as the only other source for capital.8,
In order to attract more DFI, the governments began liberalizing
their FILs. ss Although this part of the FIL cycle has not yet run its
full course, there is strong evidence to suggest that the pendulum
has swung completely in the other direction. Instead of being too
restrictive, Latin American FILs are becoming too permissive. In-
stead of discouraging DFI, liberal FILs are causing DFI to pour
into Latin American countries such as Mexico; even the ANCOM
countries have backed away considerably from the rigid prohibi-
tions of Decision 24. Yet, lurking behind this new trend in Latin
American FILs is the danger that this flood of new DFI will erode
sovereign control and cause political instability. Given Latin
America's new hunger for DFI, it is not surprising that these coun-
tries liberalized their FILs by repealing the restrictive aspects of
the old FILs. The following sections discuss the changes that Latin
American countries have made in their FILs, but the focus remains
on the same elements previously discussed in Part II of this
Article.8"
A. Relaxed Screening and Approval Procedures
Latin American countries have begun to relax the registration
and approval procedures for DFI; however, few have actually be-
gun to streamline the process itself. Mexico, for example, has ag-
gressively streamlined its approval and screening process within
the last two years. No longer do foreign investors seek governmen-
tal approval for an investment in a newly-formed Mexican com-
pany if the investment does not exceed U.S. $100 million and
meets certain other conditions.8 7 In addition, foreign investors now
84. Jova, Smith & Crigler, supra note 6, at 31; Factors, supra note 9, at 672 ("After
reaching a peak of U.S. $17.24 billion in 1981, direct investment flows have plummeted to
U.S. $11.6 billion in 1982, and to U.S. $7.80 billion in 1983."). Note that even in 1987, for-
eign investors were uncertain whether many developing countries would welcome DFI, al-
though by 1987, Mexico was already engineering debt-for-equity swaps in the tourism,
agribusiness, and chemical industries. Joan Berger, An Offer the Third World Can't Refuse,
Bus. WK., June 29, 1987, at 65.
85. Although Mexico had already begun debt-for-equity swaps, the Mexican govern-
ment still had a great many trade barriers in place, to which the U.S. government objected
as late as 1988. Keith M. Rockwell, U.S. Targets Mexican Investment Barriers, J. COM.,
Feb. 10, 1988, at 2A.
86. See supra notes 6-22 and accompanying text.
87. The following are conditions which a foreign investor must satisfy to avoid the need
for governmental approval:
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have a three year window in which they may acquire all the shares
of an existing Mexican company without governmental approval,
provided that the proposed investment meets the same conditions
as those for investment in a new business.88 However, even with
these improvements, foreign investors still feel that the application
and approval process takes too long. Companies such as Subway
Sandwich Shops and ShowBiz Pizza have experienced great diffi-
culty and delay in trying to obtain approval of their applications.
For example, it took ShowBiz two years to gain approval of its
franchising agreement from the Mexican government. The com-
pany finally abandoned the deal and was forced to forego royalties,
even though it had already opened twelve units.8 ' Subway Sand-
wiches has claimed that its plans were foiled by the "all-powerful
(1) the investment in fixed assets does not exceed U.S. $100 million;
(2) the investment is funded from a non-Mexican source and the paid-in capital
equals at least 20% of the total investment in fixed assets;
(3) the company's industrial sites are not located in areas of high industrial con-
centration (e.g., Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey);
(4) the company maintains a neutral or positive foreign currency balance during
the first three years of operation;
(5) the company creates permanent jobs and establishes training and develop-
ment programs for employees;
(6) the company uses adequate technologies to satisfy environmental require-
ments; and
(7) the company is not engaged in activities subject to special restrictions (e.g.,
agriculture, forestry, and fishing).
Regional Developments (Latin America), 24 INT'L LAW. 235, 278 (1990) [hereinafter Re-
gional Developments II] (citing Reglamento de la Ley para Promover la Inversi6n Mexi-
cana y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera, art. 5, 428 D.O. 14, 15, May 16, 1989 (hereinafter
New Regulations]).
88. Regional Developments II, supra note 87, at 278. For a non-Latin American com-
parison, see the changes that Canada has made in its review procedures through the Invest-
ment Canada Act. Evans, supra, note 26, at 87-97. Evans concludes that Canada may not be
for up sale, but that it is certainly "open for business" again. Id. at 97. In Ireland, the
Industrial Development Agency (IDA) assists companies wishing to form a venture in that
country and the procedure for forming a capital venture only takes about eight weeks, while
costing very little. After drawing up a memorandum and articles of association, which costs
about 250 pounds, the processing of the application for public company status takes about
eight weeks and costs about 80 pounds. The company must then submit the documents to
the registrar of public companies. Christopher Thomas Griffith, The Republic of Ireland's
Foreign Investment, Licensing, Intellectual Property Law: A Guide for the Practitioner, 12
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 12 (1987) (citing Companies Act §§ 6,11,12,14, and 17, re-
printed in 14 COM. L. WORLD 1025-29). Argentina, a non-ANCOM country, also has simpli-
fied its registration and approval process. The Application Authority keeps a Registry of
Investments; however, registration of investments is optional, and the procedure now con-
sists of only a one-page filing. Regional Developments II, supra note 87, at 825.
89. Chip Ricketts, New Laws Open Mexico to Franchisors, DALLAS Bus. J., Feb. 19,
1990, at 1.
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regulatory agency called the Technology Transfer Bureau." 90 A
company spokesman pointed out that the Bureau put "franchise
applicants through a paperwork gauntlet" and that the Bureau
"had unlimited discretion in evaluating the terms of franchise
agreement." 91
ANCOM countries have also begun to relax their application
and approval processes, but they are moving at a much slower rate
than Mexico. Note, however, that Chile, one of the original
ANCOM countries, has abandoned the pact and has pursued an
independent course.92 At first, Chile adopted the ANCOM strategy
of trying to regulate the type and amount of DFI that flowed into
specific industries in the country by means of a screening and ap-
proval procedure. DL 1748 gave the Chilean Foreign Investment
Committee the exclusive power to authorize DFI under Article 12.
The Foreign Investment Committee had to approve DFI if it was
over U.S. $5 million, in public services areas normally reserved for
the state, in media and communications, and from foreign, state, or
public institutions.9 3 However, Chile also implemented an innova-
tive procedure that allowed the Executive Secretary of the Foreign
Investment Committee and the Minister of the Economy alone to
approve DFI of less than $5 million. Therefore, DFI of less than $5
million was put on an approval "fast-track." ' This "fast track"
procedure is an excellent idea in that it helps eliminate the admin-
istrative logjam that can develop when an agency must approve all
DFI applications. Chile could probably improve this "fast track"
system, however, if it were to raise the exemption limit. Although
Mexico's new limit of U.S. $100 million for new transfer agree-
ments seems a bit too high, amounts in the range of U.S. $10 mil-
lion seems reasonable.
The most dramatic streamlining of the application and ap-
proval process has come in Colombia, where streamlining and sim-
plification of DFI approval procedures now allow projects con-
forming to governmental criteria to be approved in four weeks. If
the documentation is not complete, the government will issue a
90. Matt Moffett, For U.S. Firms, Franchising in Mexico Gets More Appetizing,
Thanks to Reform, WALL ST. J. (Eastern ed.), Jan. 3, 1991, at A6.
91. Id.
92. Murphy, supra note 4, at 645.
93. Foreign Investment Statute, Decree-Law No. 1748, art. 16, March 11, 1977 (Chile),
reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 134, 137 (1978) [hereinafter DL 1748]; see also Thornton, supra note
14, at 260.
94. See Thornton, supra note 14, at 260.
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temporary permit for twelve weeks until the documentation is ob-
tained and the approval process runs its course. e5 The Colombian
model is attractive in that it expedites the approval process for the
foreign investor, while still allowing the government to maintain
the control of the influx of DFI. The fact that the government has
criteria that define the kind of DFI that it will approve is also
helpful, although there undoubtedly will be disputes over those cri-
teria. The best feature of this system is that the foreign investor
can begin operations in a very short time without first having to
run a paperwork gauntlet. If investors have to provide more docu-
mentation or fill out paperwork, they can do so while setting up
operations. When contrasted with the long delays that investors
have experienced in Mexico, this model is vastly superior.
Venezuela has also taken steps to improve its registration and
approval process. In Venezuela, a foreign investor may now register
a local branch without approval from SIEX. This procedure con-
trasts with the previous situation, where local commercial registries
would not register local branches without approval of SIEX, and
SIEX would refuse to register the local branch "unless the local
branch was required by the foreign investor to perform a specific
contract with the Venezuelan government .. ."9' Foreign inves-
tors may also acquire stock and other equity interests in Venezue-
lan companies without first having to obtain SIEX approval.9 7 In
contrast to the 1970s, SIEX actually encourages branch, technical
assistance, and engineering services company formations in previ-
ously prohibited areas by exploiting loopholes in Venezuela's re-
strictive DFI laws, thereby encouraging investment in important
industries, e.g., the petrochemical industry, where it lacks technical
expertise. "' In addition, foreign investors now have an incentive to
register an investment because registered investors have access to
the foreign currency necessary to remit dividends and repatriate
their investments if exchange controls are in effect, as long as the
investors adhere to requirements promulgated by the Central
Bank. While the Venezuelan system is not as streamlined as the
Colombian model, or as liberal in allowing DFI into the country as
the Mexican model, Venezuela has made great progress in improv-
95. Decree 1265, July 10, 1987 (Colom.). See also INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE, supra note 25, at 67; Legal Memoranda (Colombia), 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 245, 248-51 (1987).
96. Regional Developments II, supra note 87, at 835.
97. Id. at 835-36.
98. See Radway & Hoet-Linares, supra note 24, at 27-28.
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ing its registration and approval system.
B. Relaxed Equity Participation Limitations
Latin American countries are also moving to relax equity par-
ticipation restrictions, though at different speeds, with Mexico
moving the fastest of them all. Mexico has relaxed restrictions on
DFI in previously restricted industries.9 9 The government may now
authorize foreign investors to purchase, through temporary trust
arrangements, an unlimited percentage of beneficial rights to
shares in companies engaged in activities such as air and maritime
transportation, gas distribution, and the production of secondary
petrochemicals. 10 Factors that the government will consider in ap-
proving such investments include whether the company is exper-
iencing severe financial difficulties and whether the majority of
production will be exported. 1' 1 The trust arrangements have a
twenty-year cap, and a governmental officer must participate on
the trust's technical committee as a voting member. 102 Mexico also
published a narrow and exclusive list of primary and secondary
petrochemicals, thereby liberalizing investment in the petrochemi-
cal industry.103 Mexico still prohibits foreign investment in pri-
mary petrochemicals, and secondary petrochemicals may only be
produced by Mexican companies with foreign equity participation
not greater than forty percent.10 4 However, foreigners may now
own a 100% equity stake in a company that produces petrochemi-
cals not on the government's list.
03
ANCOM countries have also significantly relaxed restrictions
on equity participation, though not to the degree that Mexico has.
99. Argentina, by contrast, now allows foreign investors to invest in the country by
purchasing existing businesses or establishing new ones under the same conditions applica-
ble to local investors. Regional Developments II, supra note 87, at 825. Ireland, by contrast,
has no equity participation limitations and one commentator has advised lesser developed
countries (LDC's) to emulate Ireland's approach in this area. Griffith, supra note 88, at 11.
Singapore, a country which has enjoyed phenomenal growth in the last twenty-five years,
also does not require local equity participation. TAN CHWEE HUAT, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
INSTITuMONS IN SINGAPORE 10 (4th ed. 1985).
100. See New Regulations, supra note 87.
101. See Regional Developments II, supra note 87, at 278.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. For the government publication of the list of primary and secondary petro-
chemicals, see Resoluci6n que Clasifica los Productos Petroquimicos que se Indican, Dentro
de la Petroquimica Bdsica o Secundaria, 431 D.O. 22, Aug. 15, 1989.
105. Regional Developments II, supra note 87, at 278.
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In May 1987, Decision 220 eliminated Decision 24's "mixed" and
"national" ownership requirements, except for those investors who
wish to take advantage of the intra-Andean tariff and other trade
benefits.1 6 Moreover, even in cases where the transformation to
these forms of ownership must occur, the time period for transfor-
mation is expanded from fifteen to thirty years (thirty-seven years
in Bolivia and Ecuador). 0 7 However, investments in certain sectors
of the member countries' economies are still forbidden. Decision
220, Article 3 provides: "The member countries will not authorize
direct foreign investment in activities considered properly man-
aged by local existing companies."' 10 8
Colombia now allows fifty-fifty joint ventures between Ecope-
trol and foreign investors in the petroleum industry, as long as the
foreign investor assume6 the exploration risks. The government
also allows joint ventures in the coal industry. In addition, export
industries can be 100 percent foreign-owned, if eighty percent of
the output is exported to non-ANCOM countries. Finally, invest-
ment in six free trade zones may be 100 percent foreign-owned. °9
The government also liberalized its policies in the financial service
industry to allow "mixed" banks that maintained the forty-nine
percent limitation on foreign participation.'1 0
Peru still abides by Decision 24 and 220, but now a national
investor may transfer its shares to a foreign investor if the foreign
investor can show that the transfer will benefit the Peruvian econ-
omy."1 Peru began to interpret Decision 24 in favor of encouraging
foreign investment in 1982. For example, it began to allow 100 per-
cent foreign ownership of enterprises that did not intend to take
advantage of the Andean pact's special incentive for regional inte-
106. Herbert Lindow, The Andean Pact Relaunched: Implications for the United
States, Bus. AM., Oct. 12, 1987, at 12; Regional Developments I, supra note 79, at 223.
107. Lindow, supra note 106, at 12.
108. Id.
109. INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 25, at 65.
110. Id. at 66. Note also that non-Latin American countries are relaxing their equity
participation requirements. Malaysia, for example, relaxed its policy prohibiting foreigners
from owning more than a 30% equity stake in companies outside the country's eight free
trade zones in 1984. The govbrnment announced that foreigners might be granted the right
to own up to 70% of the equity, but it was not clear whether 70% was the absolute ceiling.
Li Shui-Hua, New Incentives for Foreign Investment, 6 East Asia Executive Reports 13
(July 15, 1984). Malaysia began studying agricultural and fishing industry incentives in
1984. However, the incentives were expected to be discouraged by a prohibition of foreign
ownership of agricultural land under the amended national land code. Id.




gration, e.g., tariff barriers.112 It also has passed a law creating In-
dustrial Free Trade Zones and Zones with Special Treatment.
113
Companies established in the free trade zones are exempt for fif-
teen years from import and export duties, exchange controls, Deci-
sion 220 restrictions, and a host of taxes.""
Recent changes in Venezuela's foreign investment laws allow a
foreign investor to own 100 percent of the capital stock of a Vene-
zuelan company active in local marketing.115 More importantly,
however, Venezuela's president has recently made a bid to change
Article 5 of the oil industry nationalization law, which bans DFI in
most oil-related activities. While critics charge that the president
is preparing to sell out the national oil industry in order to raise
money to reach higher production levels, 1 the government con-
tends that DFI may be the only way, in view of the Persian Gulf
crisis, that Venezuela can set itself up as a secure source of oil for
industrialized economies.' 7 Regardless of the outcome of the gov-
ernmental debate on privatization, Pequiven, the Venezuelan state
petrochemical concern has launched a U.S. $1 billion expansion
program in partnership with local private investors, foreign inves-
tors, and investment from the stock exchange. 1
In sum, Mexico has moved boldly to increase the levels of for-
eign investment participation in a great many of its industries by
eliminating the suffocating forty-nine percent rule. ANCOM coun-
tries are also removing restrictions, but many still impose a forty-
nine percent foreign investor equity restriction in many important
industries.
C. Relaxed Restrictions on Technology Transfer Agreements
Mexico published new regulations to the Mexican Transfer of
Technology Law which superseded more restrictive regulations but
did not amend the Transfer of Technology Law itself. 1
9 The new
112. INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 25, at 236.
113. The two industrial Free Trade Zones are Matarani and Peru, both of which are
harbors located in the southern part of Peru. Regional Developments II, supra note 87, at
834-35 (citing Law No. 25100, Sept. 29, 1989 (Venez.)).
114. Regional Developments II, supra note 87, at 834.





119. Id. at 831.
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Regulations loosen the registration requirements of management
agreements. The only agreements that now need to be registered
are those agreements that allow the foreign licensor to intervene
directly in the company's decision-making process. 20 In addition,
software license agreements need only be registered when they
grant the local licensees the authority to produce, distribute, or
market the software programs.'"' Further, franchisors need only
register a model of a franchise agreement with the National Regis-
try of Transfer of Technology (NRTT) and every six months file
signed copies of actual franchise agreements that make reference
to the model agreement.' 2 The new regulations also liberalize the
interpretation of certain clauses the previous regulations
forbade.'
23
Most importantly, the new regulations restrict the discretion-
ary power of the NRTT. Now, the NRTT may only object to an
agreement on grounds expressly set forth in the TTL and its regu-
lations. 2" Yet, even if an agreement contains one or more clauses
deemed to be objectionable under the regulations, article 53 still
provides that the NRTT may still register the agreement if the
agreement will benefit the country.' 5 Finally, the NRTT still has
120. Id.
121. Id.; see also Pitts, supra note 5, at A13.
122. Regional Developments II, supra note 87, at 831.
123. For example, under the regulations:
(a) a tie-in provision will be admissible if the technology agreement establishes
trademark rights and the licensor agrees to supply. certain inputs to the licensee
in order to maintain the quality, prestige, and public image of the products man-
ufactured under the agreement;
(b) a clause establishing minimum production levels will be admissible if the
agreement grants an exclusive license to the licensee;
(c) a confidentiality clause extending beyond the term of the agreement will be
admissible if a risk of public disclosure of the technical know-how covered by
that clause is demonstrated; and
(d) a confidentiality clause in a registered amendment agreement covering sub-
stantial improvements to licensed technology previously supplied by the licensor
will be effective for up to ten years from the date of the amendment, regardless
of the duration of the original agreement, provided that the improvements will
increase production, quality, and competitiveness of the licensee.
Id. at 832.
124. Id.
125. Article 53 of the Regulations provides that the NRTT may register an agreement
upon meeting the following conditions:
(a) the agreement does not fall within any registration exceptions set forth by
the TTL or the regulations.
(b) the execution of the agreement benefits the country in any of the following
ways
(1) generates employment;
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the authority under the TTL to object to royalty rates when they
are unreasonable or excessive, but the new regulations are silent on
the subject of royalties.12 6 Moreover, the Ministry of Commerce
and Industrial Development has indicated that Mexican industry
has matured enough to negotiate its own payment terms, so that
the NRTT will now permit royalty clauses if they are freely negoti-
ated between the parties. 12 7 As a consequence of liberalizing the
technology transfer regulations, Mexico is experiencing a sudden
rise in the number of new transfer agreements registered, espe-
cially in the franchising area. 2 8
Further, the Mexican Congress is expected to vote on new leg-
islation that will amend the present law this spring. The proposed
legislation would "lengthen the term of patent protection from 14
to 20 years, and trademark protection from 5 to 10 years." 29 'Yet,
passage of this new legislation is not assured. It is important to
note that regulations, while modifying the law, are not the law
themselves. Furthermore, it is indicative of the strong nationalist
political tendencies still present in Mexico today that the Mexican
government has been unable to change the present law governing
(2) improves the technical qualifications of local human resources;
(3) gives access to new markets in other countries;
(4) makes possible the local manufacture of new products, especially if
they replace importations;
(5) improves the foreign currency balance;
(6) reduces unitary costs of production, as measured in constant pesos;
(7) develops local suppliers;
(8) uses technologies that do not contribute to the deterioration of the
environment;
(9) fosters research and technological development activities at produc-
tion facilities or related technical research centers; and
(c) the licensee declares before the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Devel-
opment, under oath, that it wishes to enter into the agreement as submitted,
that execution of the agreement will result in any of the benefits described in (b)
above, and that it will demonstrate the latter within a period of three years from
the date of the registration of the agreement.
Regional Developments II, supra note 87, at 832.
126. Id. at 833.
127. Id.
128. Companies such as Subway Sandwiches, Domino's Pizza, Chili's Hamburger Grill,
Blockbuster Video, Athlete's Foot, and Kwik-Kopy Corp. are rushing to start franchises,
while companies such as McDonald's Corp., Holiday Corp.'s Holiday Inn, and Kentucky
Fried Chicken wish to add to franchises already present in Mexico. For instance, Kentucky
Fried Chicken hopes to increase its 53 outlets to over 200 in the next five years, and the
number of companies participating in the Mexican Franchise Association trade show rose
from nine last year to 40 this year. See Moffett, supra note 90.
129. Pitts, supra note 5.
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the regulations."' This state of affairs is a cause for concern to
foreign investors as, presently, the status of intellectual property
rights can change with each new set of regulations, which does lit-
tle to inspire investor confidence.
Although ANCOM countries have changed their posture on
technology transfer agreements, they still substantially restrict the
terms of the agreements. The Andean Pact recently passed Deci-
sion 220, which liberalized ANCOM's posture concerning technol-
ogy transfer agreements in that it encouraged rather than discour-
aged such transfers." 1 Under Decision .220, national authorities




Venezuela has changed its FIL to allow foreign investors and
Venezuelans to conclude technology transfer agreements without
approval from SIEX. The exception to this new rule is that SIEX
approval is required if one of the parties to the agreement is a
Venezuelan company characterized as a foreign enterprise and the
other is a non-domiciled foreign parent or affiliate. However, this
exception only applies if the royalty exceeds five percent of the net
technological sales. Finally, Venezuela fell into step with Decision
220 by allowing a Venezuelan company characterized as a foreign
enterprise to pay royalties to its non-domiciled foreign parent or
affiliate. " s
Peru's National Committee for Foreign Investment and Tech-
nology (CONITE) also amended its technology transfer regulations
to conform to Decision 220.13" Under the new regulations, CONITE
may allow a subsidiary to pay royalties to its parent per Decision
220; however, it will still not authorize technology transfer agree-
ments between a Peruvian branch and its head office abroad. 135
With respect to technology transfer agreements, Mexico has
taken bold steps toward easing the restrictions that it had previ-
ously imposed. However, because Mexico has only changed its reg-
ulations regarding transfer agreements and not its actual laws,
130. Id.
131. See Regional Developments I, supra note 79, at 222.
132. Id.; see text accompanying .supra note 78.
133. See Regional Developments II, supra note 87, at 835; see also supra note 114 and
accompanying text.





there is no guarantee that the attractive environment for transfer
agreements that exists today will exist in the future. ANCOM
countries, too, have changed their posture regarding transfer agree-
ments. However, ANCOM countries still impose substantial re-
strictions, and these restrictions continue to discourage foreign
investors.
IV. RESTRICTIVE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS THAT
SHOULD BE INCLUDED TO PROTECT IMPORTANT NATIONAL
INTERESTS
What follows are suggestions that Latin American countries
should consider for implementation in the FILs to help them at-
tain a balance between DFI and sovereign control in their coun-
tries. These suggestions are by no means exhaustive, nor are they
meant to be, as Latin American countries will necessarily need to
consider a great many elements of their FILs in striking a success-
ful balance.
A. There Must Be Clear and Streamlined Application and
Approval Procedures
Jtirgen Voss noted that conduct in the "grey zone," which in-
cludes restrictive trade measures, is the real risk factor faced by
developing countries. 3' He also noted that the greatest disincen-
tive to DFI was dealing with local authorities. 37 Foreign investors
do not like to deal with foreign authorities because their applica-
tion and approval procedures are unclear and cause substantial de-
lays. Therefore, one of the easiest ways to offer foreign investors an
incentive to invest in a given country is to make the application
and approval procedures for DFI easy to understand and easy to
comply with.
This is not to say that Latin American countries should not
keep certain screening and approval procedures as a way of exer-
cising control over DFI entering the country. By controlling the
amount of DFI that flows into the country, the government is bet-
ter able to maintain political and social stability within the country
and can control the country's economy and development. Such an
136. Voss, supra note 3, at 703 (citing Ifo-Institut, Investionspolitik der Entwicklung-




approval and registration process would be worthless if the govern-
ment does not have a clearly-defined national development plan.
However, Latin American countries should consider taking
steps to better streamline their application and approval processes,
perhaps by adapting the Colombian model to their own systems to
avoid delay, as delay in approval of DFI is an important disincen-
tive. Governments may also be able to streamline this process by
promulgating clear guidelines for approval of DFI. These guide-
lines should include precise definitions of terms, types of busi-
nesses, royalty amounts, and so forth. If there are methods of
avoiding the prima facie restrictions of DFI laws so that both the
government and the investor can reasonably attain their objectives,
the office should market them as Venezuela's SIEX has done. If a
government and an investor both clearly understand when, and
under what conditions, DFI is allowed to enter the economy, there
will be little opportunity for dispute and, consequently, delay.
Moreover, the governments of developing countries must in-
vest resources to effectively administer a registration and approval
process if the process is not to become a deterrent to DFI. As the
change in Venezuela's administration of its FIL demonstrates, the
administrative personnel should have a background in interna-
tional trade or economics, and there should be enough staff to con-
trol DFI proposals. In addition, Latin American governments
should consider excluding smaller amounts of DFI that will have
little impact on the country's economy, as Mexico has done with
technology transfer agreements. Finally, the agency charged with
administering the FIL should be given the power to negotiate the
details of, and give final approval to, DFI proposals that clearly fall
under a statute or within a guideline.
If Latin American countries implement some or all of these
suggestions, they should be able to control DFI flowing into their
countries without jeopardizing the control they must exercise over
the economic and political life of their countries.
B. There Must Be Some Equity Participation Restrictions
in Important National Industries
Latin American countries should allow foreigners to hold ma-
jority positions in some industries, but they should be very careful
to retain control over important national industries and resources,
as the price for loss of control may be much higher than the short-
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term gains realized today.
Clearly, a forty-nine percent rule across the board has not
worked in either Mexico or the ANCOM countries. Foreign inves-
tors simply do not want to invest millions of dollars in a company
if they lack the power to control the destiny of their investment.
Therefore, Latin American countries should consider doing away
with the forty-nine percent rule, except for industries or natural
resources of national importance. For instance, Mexico or Vene-
zuela should allow a 100 percent foreign equity stake in a Pepsi
subsidiary but only allow a minority stake in its oil or mining in-
dustries. Oil and mining industries are non-renewable resources
that the governments of these countries should manage carefully.
Since these industries play such an important role in these coun-
tries' economic, political, and environmental stability, it would be
sheer folly to allow them to fall into foreign hands. Nevertheless,
both of these countries should consider allowing foreign interests
to take minority positions in these industries, as they may help
boost productivity and bring in more capital, management know-
how, and advanced technology.
Latin American countries are beginning to realize, therefore,
that, while they need to control important business and industry,
they should avoid expropriative measures in asserting that control.
Yet, Latin American countries should also avoid future expropria-
tions by prudently considering whether they should denationalize
important businesses and industries now. A country should not sell
off its public services and important industries now if there is a
distinct possibility that the country will later want, if not need, to
assert control over that business or industry. For example, Mexico
may be imprudently privatizing one of its most important indus-
tries, Telefonos de Mexico (TELMEX), its telephone industry.
138
The Mexican government has recently sold the rights to private
investors to acquire a fifty-one percent voting stake in the state-
owned telephone company. After completing the sale to these large
investors, the government plans to offer the rest of its stake in the
company on foreign stock markets.139 After the TELMEX shares
hit the international markets, it is very likely that foreign investors
will hold a majority stake in TELMEX. 1'0
138. See Smith, supra note 5, at A3.
139. Id.
140. Id. Note that foreign investors did not gain a majority interest in TELMEX when
the rights to the shares were sold at auction. Grupo Carso, a Mexican mining, manufactur-
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Mexico may feel that selling off TELMEX to foreign investors
is a good idea today, mainly because it believes that foreign inves-
tors will help upgrade Mexico's phone system, thereby improving
its infrastructure and its attractiveness for further DFI.'4 ' How-
ever, there is no assurance that the present government is going to
stay in power. Moreover, there is a strong nationalistic opposition
in Mexico that, if it comes to power, will almost certainly undo a
complete privatization. Why, then, does Mexico not move ahead
more slowly? The potential damage to a country's image as an in-
vestment prospect will be much greater than any gain it could real-
ize from increased foreign investor participation now or in the near
future. If the reason for privatizing the telephone company is to
make it more efficient, Mexico should realize that it has really only
negotiated a huge technology transfer agreement. In fact, if Mexico
had negotiated a technology transfer agreement for the phone
company, it may have realized more in the long term. Under such
an agreement, Mexico could have maintained control of the enter-
prise and bought the necessary technology. Now, the present gov-
ernment is open to the charge that it has sold off an important
national industry, which may lead to the eventual undoing of not
only the sale, but also the government itself.
In conclusion, Latin American countries should do away with
the forty-nine percent rule in all industries that are not of national
importance and should consider relaxing equity participation
prohibitions in industries that are. However, Latin American coun-
tries should avoid allowing foreigners to take majority equity
stakes in important national industries. Foreign control may create
a national backlash that could once again raise expropriation's ugly
head.
C. There Ought to Be Some Restrictions on Technology
Transfer Agreements
Latin American countries may want to continue to impose
some restrictions on holders of intellectual property rights when
such transferees misuse their rights unfairly to prevent the ex-
ing and tobacco concern, bought over half of the initial rights, so the full privatization, and
the eventual foreign majority, cannot take place until there are succeeding stock offerings.
Southwestern Bell maintains a strong interest in gaining further control of TELMEX since
it purchased an option to buy an additional block of shares in an amount equal to the rights
that it had already acquired. Id.
141. See text preceding supra note 9, especially factor 2 on infrastructure.
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ploitation of the technology or to extort an unfair price for a li-
cense to further exploit the technology.142 With this in mind, the
ANCOM countries should consider relaxing their technology trans-
fer laws by exempting smaller transfer agreements. Exempting
142. One commentator has suggested that Ireland's intellectual property laws may be
an excellent model for developing countries to follow. Patents in Ireland are granted for 16
years, with extensions of five or ten years if the invention is of exceptional merit and the
patentee has not been adequately remunerated. Griffith, supra note 88, at 20 (citing Patents
Act § 25 (Ir. 1964), reprinted in 62 PAT. & TRADE MARK RzV. 189, 220-21 (1965)). Griffith
suggests that developing countries should consider a provision allowing extension upon the
patentee showing cause. Id. at 21. Yet, Ireland's patent law includes a "compulsory license"
provision if the patentee does not exploit its patent within the first three or four years, or if
it seeks to achieve the highest possible licensing fee should the article invented enjoy great
demand. See id. (citing Patents Act § 39 (Ir. 1964), reprinted in 62 PAT. & TRADE MARK
REv. 189, 231-32 (1965)). "A customary license may be granted at any time if deemed in the
public interest to do so without complying with the waiting period." Id. at 21 n.119 (citing
Paris Conventions, art. 5A, discussed in [Doing Business in Europe] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) para. 25,479 (1982)).
These rights are deemed abused if:
a) the invention, although suited to commercial exploitation, is not being ex-
ploited to its fullest extent; b) commercial exploitation is being prevented by the
patentee's importation; c) demand is not being adequately met on reasonable
terms or to a substantial effect by importation only; d) patentee's refusal to
grant a license on reasonable terms prejudice's the trade of anyone in Ireland; or
e) a trade or industry is unfairly prejudiced by conditions the patentee attaches
to the purchase, hire, license, or use of a patented article or working of the pat-
ent process.
These rights are also abused when any contract relating to the sale or li-
cense of the patented article contains conditions disallowing the purchaser or
licensee from using any article supplied by others or requires them to obtain
from the patentee any article not covered by the patent. This is known as an
illegal "tying" contract.
Id. (citing Patents Act § 39(2)(a)-(e) (Ir. 1964), reprinted in 63 PAT. & TRADE MARK REv.
189, 231-32 (1965)).
Irish trademark law is another excellent example that developing countries may wish to
emulate. In Ireland, "[t]rademarks are granted for a term of seven years and may be re-
newed upon application and payment of renewal fees." Griffith, supra note 88, at 23. "The
registration fees vary with the type of trademark: fifteen pounds for one mark on one classi-
fication of goods; twenty pounds for defensive marks; and a renewal fee of fifty-five
pounds." Id. (citing Trade Mark Rules, First Schedule, (Ir. 1963), discussed in [Doing Busi-
ness in Europe] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) para. 25,486 (1982)). In other respects, Irish
trademark law is very similar to U.S. trademark law. Compare Trade Marks Act, No. 9, § 51
(Ir. 1963), reprinted in 62 PAT. & TRADE MARK REv. 23 (1963) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1114
(1982). As a result, Ireland's intellectual property law offers an encouraging contrast to Mex-
ican intellectual property law of the 1970s and 1980s.
Many experts would probably agree with Griffith. See, e.g., Pitts, supra note 5. How-
ever, for a number of reasons, the Irish model may not work for Latin America right now.
First, many of the Latin American economies are simply not diverse enough and developed
enough to allow for the terms that Mexico contemplates. Second, other Latin American
countries oppose such terms in transfer agreements because they offend notions of national
pride and excite local resistance to any overt domination or control by foreigners. Id.
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smaller agreements should relieve countries of the administrative
burden of policing such agreements without much incremental
damage to the country's interest in regulating technology transfer.
A ceiling of U.S. $100 million would probably be too high for
ANCOM countries. As Chile has done with DFI, countries might
consider putting agreements, valued at U.S. $5 million, on an ap-
proval "fast track."
On the other hand, Latin American countries, wishing to relax
their technology transfer restrictions, should follow Mexico's lead
and change their laws, not their regulations. Although such regula-
tion changes in Mexico have encouraged foreign investment, many
investors are still concerned that Mexico may revert to its former
restrictive self if these changes are not codified as law. However,
Latin American countries should not relax transfer restrictions to
allow certain previously forbidden terms if their economies are not
developed enough for competitive forces within the economy to
make use of such terms impossible. Mexico maintains that its
economy is developed enough to allow such terms, but one cannot
help but be skeptical. Perhaps Mexico is counting on integrating
its economy with the U.S. economy in a free trade agreement,
thereby creating the "development" necessary. Whatever its ra-
tionale, Mexico has chosen a risky course for itself. This course has
begun to flood Mexico with new technology transfer agreements, a
flood that may buoy the country with prosperity or drown it in
foreign influence.
The ANCOM countries, by contrast, are not developed enough
to embark upon such a perilous course. They cannot allow such
terms in their transfer agreements without losing control of their
economies. In addition, it is very unlikely that the ANCOM coun-
tries will be integrating their economies with the U.S. "mega-econ-
omy" in the near future. Finally, many ANCOM governments still
have a strong aversion to allowing such terms in technology trans-
fer agreements, as do certain elements within Mexico itself.
Mexico may be breaking its own path through the economic
jungle of the 1990s, but other Latin American countries should be
reluctant to follow.
V. CONCLUSION
Many years ago, Jova, Frank & Crigler noted, "The need to
create a successful, mutually beneficial accommodation between
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private capital and public policy remains the great task of this cen-
tury. . . .-8 Yet, as the history of Latin America demonstrates,
that "mutually beneficial accommodation" requires that a country
strike the correct balance, like a performer on a high wire. Mexico
and the ANCOM countries are continuing their struggle to find
that correct balance. 144 They are beginning to see the need for a
"receptive and liberal investment environment that recognizes the
legitimate interests of foreign investors while maintaining ade-
quate policies and procedures to ensure the soundness of the in-
vestments involved," 15 but they are still having difficulty deciding
how much, and at what rate, DFI should enter their countries in
order to strike that difficult balance. Regulating foreign investment
is an important part of a country's overall development strategy,
even a strategy aimed at relieving a country's dependency on
DFI.1" However, in today's globally interdependent economy, a
strategy aimed solely at relieving dependency is, at best, quixotic.
The policy of the ANCOM nations and Mexico of restricting DFI
has proven to be a failure because they pursued almost exclusively
the goal of greater national control and considered DFI an
afterthought.
Recently, however, most of these countries have nearly re-
versed their previous positions and are now vigorously pursuing
DFI at the expense of their own national developmental interests,
perhaps to the detriment of their countries long-term develop-
ment. For example, Mexico presently appears to be trying too hard
to attract DFI. As a consequence of going too far and too fast to-
day, the Mexican government runs the risk of being replaced by a
government sensitive to nationalist concerns and hostile to DFI.
Potentially even more disastrous, such a government may seek to
oust the foreigners in short order by expropriating their assets.
Such a turn of events would not only stop the flow of DFI into
Mexico, but such expropriative actions would almost certainly
eliminate any chance of the United States and Mexico signing a
free trade agreement. Therefore, taking such extreme measures
now may result in a greater backlash later which would be disas-
143. Jova, Frank & Crigler, supra note 6, at 3; see also supra note 13.
144. Factors, supra note 9, at 677.
145. Id.
146. "A foreign investment code necessarily plays only a small part in the overall devel-
opment strategy of any nation. By regulating foreign investment, however, nations can begin
to eliminate its adverse effects, such as dependency, and establish national control over de-
velopment." Thornton, supra note 14, at 271.
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trous for the future development of Mexico.
The ANCOM countries, on the other hand, are still very con-
cerned about the amount and form of the DFI entering their coun-
tries. Although the ANCOM countries have abandoned their ear-
lier policy of trying to keep DFI out of their countries, they are
moving very slowly in implementing policies that make their coun-
tries more attractive to DFI, such that the amount of DFI flowing
into those countries is but a trickle when compared to Mexico. As
a consequence, the ANCOM countries run the risk of becoming po-
litically unstable by restricting their economic development. Like
the present Mexican government, these governments run the risk
of being replaced; but unlike the present Mexican government,
these governments may be replaced by governments promising a
faster rate of economic development. By pursuing a slower pace in
relaxing DFI restrictions in their countries, ANCOM governments
have adopted a more moderate course and thus may avoid the na-
tionalistic backlash that may befall the present Mexican govern-
ment. Moreover, these governments, in pursuing a more conserva-
tive route, may inspire more investor confidence merely because of
the consistency of their DFI policies.
Obviously, it is too soon to tell whether Mexico or the
ANCOM nations have struck the correct balance in finding that
"mutually beneficial accommodation" between DFI and national
policy. However, if Latin American countries would at least clarify
and streamline their application and approval procedures, if they
would eliminate the forty-nine percent rule of foreign equity par-
ticipation except for important national industries, and if they
would relax some of their more restrictive technology transfer reg-
ulations, they would be taking significant steps toward attaining
that important balance.
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